1. Field of the Invention
The invention relates to a security system, and more particularly to a global system and method for monitoring a security of an asset to detect a security threat.
2. Statement of the Problem
Since the September 11 catastrophe, security has become a major concern, wherein requests to more actively track the whereabouts of trucks and other assets have been overwhelming. One area of concern is the physical security of public locations, including enterprises, campuses, and other public buildings. The security measures taken by private and public organizations since the tragic attacks have been implemented as overall preventive measures; measures that should have been implemented years ago for the safety of the public and the consumer.
Conventional physical security measures such as intrusion detection, CCTV surveillance, metal detection, perimeter security using bollards, and protection of building air intakes are often the first line of defense against terrorism for high-threat, high vulnerability infrastructures. These methods are often supplemented with operational procedures to mitigate an attack, including pre-planned evacuation strategies. Such measures, however, are not sufficient to counter unconventional threats such as dirty bombs, and chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction; nor do the conventional security measures focus on increasing security for freight elevators, loading docks or parking lots, places that are vulnerable to placement of explosives.
Another area of concern is cargo being tampered with or dangerous packages being implanted onto transporting vehicles. US Customs has implemented new rules on the advance submission of cargo manifests in the trades to the US. The new rule is stated by the US Customs: “For any vessel . . . except for any vessel exclusively carrying bulk or break bulk cargo, Customs must receive from the carrier vessel the vessel's Cargo Declaration, or an electronic equivalent, 24 hours before such cargo is laden aboard the vessel at the foreign port.”
The four core elements of the US Customs Container Security Initiative (“CSI”) focus specifically on container traffic and aims to screen inbound containers before they reach the United States. The four core elements of CSI are: (1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; (2) catching high-risk containers before they arrive at US ports; (3) using technology to quickly prescreen or inspect high-risk containers; and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers.
Failure to provide complete and timely documentation results in cargo that carriers will not load or that US Customs will not permit to unload. Importers need to make sure that their suppliers and logistics providers comply with the regulations, or risk having cargo stranded at the point of origin, or, even worse, on an inbound vessel that cannot be unloaded.
Many shipping companies attach transmitting devices to shipping containers to track their geographic location. This allows the shipping company to determine the geographic location of the container as it moves between the origination and destination points to determine whether the goods inside the container are on time, late, or somehow misplaced. For instance, the container may have been misrouted or been placed on the incorrect transportation vehicle to reach its destination. Tracking of containers in transit is well developed, including the use of satellites and other electronic technology to obtain real-time data on in-transit locations.
The tracking devices associated with the container rely on the transmission and reception of various types of communication signals, such as electromagnetic and/or radio frequency signals, for determining the geographic position. A problem occurs when the container with the tracking device is loaded onto a transportation vessel, such as a ship, wherein containers are loaded into areas of the vessel which obstruct the signals. The user is left to track the vehicle rather than the container and trust that the container did indeed get loaded onto the vessel. While out-of-range, the tracking system is essentially deactivated since it is unable to communicate with the control station.
Other known security systems include alarm systems that secure the contents of trailers/fleets from origination to destination. Local alarm systems serve as a theft deterrent by sending tamper-detection alerts. An attempt to tamper with the doors of the trailer results in the system sending an alarm to a pager carried by the drivers (allows detection only with a specific range). The system also tracks events history, such as door openings. Widespread usage of alarm systems is seen among small- and medium-sized fleets.
A radio frequency device that transmits shipping data as it passes a reader device and indicates whether the container to which it is attached has been tampered with is the “e-seal”. The e-seal consists of a bolt that locks the container when inserted into the seal body and serves as an antenna. The seal body contains a microchip for encoding the information and transmitting that information when queried by a reader. However, the container to which it is attached is required to be within range of the reader for transmission. Therefore, the data is not updated while the container is in transit between an origination and a destination. Another problem with the e-seal is that e-seals have limited signal strength and must be read at line-of-sight distances that do not exceed 70 feet. This makes it difficult to read these particular seals in marine terminals or the holds of ships where containers are stacked in close proximity or where the signals may be blocked.
Another problem is detecting packages loaded into containers and carried into buildings or other public places that poses a radiation threat. The three primary methods of detecting radiation threats in cargo containers are: (a) manual inspection, (b) remote inspection, and (c) in-container detection. The shortcomings of manual inspection are obvious. Remote inspection involves scanning a container with penetrating radiation as is done for luggage screening at airports. An important difference, however, is that airport scanners use low intensity x-rays, whereas cargo containers use high-intensity, high-energy gamma rays owing to the size and metal construction of the containers. Use of high-intensity, high-energy gamma rays is potentially harmful to humans, relies on a human observer to identify a radiation threat, requires a change in the unloading procedures, which may result in delays, and does not provide offshore protection.
Globalization and free flow of trade across porous borders is a phenomenon that terrorists and trade partners both exploit. As US companies flourish in globalization and become more visible, their overseas facilities and personnel might offer terrorists more and softer targets for anti-American sentiment. However, organizations should guard against burdensome physical security that may jeopardize free trade across friendly borders; nor should the security measures undertaken stymie the economic benefits of global information networks and international business.
For these reasons, there is a need for a reliable security system that provides the customer with a comprehensive security protection for fixed and mobile assets.